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Abstract
We investigate whether framing effects of voluntary contributions are significant in a
provision point mechanism. Our results show that framing significantly affects individuals of
the same type: cooperative individuals appear to be more cooperative in the public bads game
than in the public goods game, whereas individualistic subjects appear to be less cooperative
in the public bads game than in the public goods game. At the aggregate level of pooling all
individuals, the data suggests that framing effects are negligible, which is in contrast with the
established result.
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This paper addresses framing eects of voluntary contributions. Past literature nds that
framing eects are signicant in a standard voluntary contributions mechanism (VCM), and
their degree depends on the types of individuals based on value orientations (See, Andreoni
(1995); Park (2000)). One distinct research on framing eects is Sonnemans et al. (1998) that
employ a provision point mechanism (PPM).1 They show that framing eects are present in
such a setting as well.
However, framing eects seem not to be well-established in the PPM yet. This is because
the existing results might be compounded by strategic eects that are potentially caused
by the experimental design.2 Sonnemans et al. (1998) employ a partner design of keeping
the same group members for the entire rounds, and ask questions during experiments such
as \how much inuence she thinks her choice has on her own and other members?"3 These
designs invalidate the Nash equilibria in a static game as a guidance for prediction. They
in fact require us to derive many subgame perfect equilibria and induce strategic eects.
Thus, it is dicult to distinguish whether the resulting outcomes obtained by Sonnemans
et al. (1998) are solely derived from framing eects or from interplays between framing and
strategic eects (see Andreoni (1988); Park (2000)).4
Given this state of aairs, the purpose of this paper is to examine robustness of framing
eects in the PPM (See Cox et al. (2008) for more detailed analysis on people's preferences on
cooperation). The distinct features of our experiment are (i) a random change of partners
in each round (stranger design) and (ii) to ask no questions during experiments. These
changes in experimental designs aim at controlling strategic eects and are parallel to those
employed by Andreoni (1995) and Park (2000). Therefore, our experiment focuses upon
testing framing eects and the results can be directly compared to these previous works.
We hypothesize that framing eects are not signicant in the PPM when strategic eects
are controlled. This hypothesis is motivated by recent evidences that people's social pref-
erences may possess not only self-interest motivations but also eciency concerns (Hichri
(2004), Brekke et al. (2003) and Engelmann and Strobel (2004)). If the eciency concerns
are important to some extent, there is no wonder that framing eects are mitigated by the
existence of a socially ecient equilibrium that is created by an addition of a provision
point. Although there is no systematic way to estimate the degree of eciency concerns,
an alternative method called value orientations theory can be applied as an approximation
(Liebrand (1984)). In this paper, we also apply this theory and explore the dierence of
cooperative behaviors for each preference of individuals.
Our experimental evidences might suggest an interesting policy implication especially for
1In this paper, we consistently use the term \provision point mechanisms" to refer to voluntary contribu-
tions mechanisms in which a public good is provided if total contribution exceeds some threshold, following
the term given by Davis and Holt (1992). Sonnemans et al. (1998) and others adopt the terminology, a
step-level public good, to represent an identical class of contribution mechanisms.
2In this paper, we use the term \strategic eects" to refer to the eects that are beyond characterization
of the equilibrium in public goods/bad games such as reputational eects (Andreoni (1988) and Park (2000)).
3Andreoni (1995) and Park (2000) use a stranger design in which group members are randomly regrouped
in each round and do not ask any question to subjects during experiments.
4Andreoni (1988) shows there exist the signicant strategic eects of a partner design. Park (2000) also
points out that strategic eects could be confounding factors for testing framing eects.
1public bads prevention. Rondeau et al. (2005) demonstrate that higher eciency is achieved
through voluntary contributions in a single shot application of the PPM than in that of the
VCM on average. Given this evidence and the signicance of framing eects observed in
the VCM, we could claim the following: creating a provision point would yield more social
welfare gain in public bads prevention than in public goods provision if the hypothesis in
this study is supported.
2 Experimental design
At the beginning of experiments, each participant was informed that the experiment
consists of two stages. In the rst stage, a value orientation experiment was conducted and
a framing experiment was followed in the second stage.
With a value orientation experiment, we categorize subjects into ve types depending
on each subject's social goal: 1. Competitors|those who want to be better o than others;
2. Individualistic|those who want to do best for themselves; 3. Cooperative|those who
try the best for both themselves and others; 4. Altruistic|those who want to do best for
others; and 5. Aggressive|those who want to do worst for others. This experiment follows
Park (2000) and therefore we omit further explanations.
In the second stage, two treatments of public goods and bads settings were conducted to
test the eects of framing. Each participant was randomly assigned to a group of ve people
for 10 rounds of the experiment and allocated to either goods or bads experiments. In each
round, each subject was asked to make a choice between Yellow and Blue where she did
not know the identity of group members but she knew that group members were shued in
each round. After each round, subjects were informed about the number of Yellow choices
in their group and the resulting payo.
The left sub-table in table 1 summarizes the game of public goods provision. Subjects
determined whether to contribute 60 cents (Yellow) or not (Blue). If more than three mem-
bers in a group give 60 cents (Yellow), everybody received a group-revenue of 245 cents,
otherwise a group revenue is 60.
The right sub-table in table 1 summarizes the game of public bads prevention. The choice
has to be made on whether to take 60 cents (Yellow) or not (Blue). If two or fewer members
in a group took 60 cents, everybody received a group revenue of 185 cents.
The incentives in the two treatments are identical, and the experimental design is the
same as the one in Sonnemans et al. (1998) except that a stranger design was employed, and
no questionnaire was asked during experiments.
In the games, there are two pure Nash equilibria: (i) one asymmetric Nash equilibrium in
which exactly three players cooperate and (ii) one symmetric Nash equilibrium in which all
players do not cooperate. Since we employ the stranger design, these Nash equilibria could
be considered as a prediction of group decisions. It must also be noted that social eciency
is achieved only when the group contributions reach the threshold of public goods provision
or of public bads prevention.
The experiments were conducted in the computerized experimental lab of Yokohama
National University. Subjects were volunteers from undergraduate students in various elds
except economics. We recruited 40 subjects in each condition of public goods and bads
settings for a total of 80 subjects. The data were collected in two separate sessions in each of
2which 40 subjects were recruited, randomly divided into two rooms of 20 each, and assigned
to numbered desks. In each session, a value orientation experiment was rst conducted, and
a dierent condition of framing experiments was followed. Each session lasted about one
hour. The average earning per subject was approximately $15, whose calculation is based
on the sum of experimental earnings from 10 rounds of the experiment.5
3 Results
We rst report the result of value orientations. Out of 80 subjects, 57 were classied as
individualistic (71.2%): 27 in the goods setting and 30 in the bads setting. Nineteen subjects
were classied as cooperative (24%): 10 in the good setting and 9 in the bads setting. Four
subjects (3 in the goods setting and 1 in the bads setting) were classied as competitive.6
This distribution is similar in each of goods and bads setting as well as to the ones in the
past literature. Most subjects are either classied as individualistic or cooperative, and thus
our analysis focuses on these two types in what follows.
We now present the percentage of cooperative choices of subjects with dierent value
orientations in each of the two treatments. Table 2 shows the percentage of cooperative
choices with each value orientation and treatment. In the goods setting, the percentage
of cooperative choices is 38.6%, and its dierence between cooperative and individualistic is
negligible (See table 2 and 38:9 38:0 = 0:9% dierence). In the bads setting, the percentage
of cooperative choices is 35.5%, and its dierence between cooperative and individualistic is
signicant (See table 2 and 55:5   27:3 = 28:2% dierence). From this result, we could say
that the rate of cooperative choices between the two treatments seems not to be dierent,
while it is signicantly dierent per value orientation especially in the bads setting. To
conrm this observation, we will run a series of statistical testings in what follows.
Figure 1 displays the percentage of cooperative choices per period for both of the treat-
ments. The slight dierence appears to exist: cooperative choices are made more often in
the goods setting than in the bads setting, but its degree seems to be small. We apply a
Mann-Whitney test using the percentage of cooperative choices per round as observation.
Our results cannot reject the null hypothesis that the distributions are the same in both of
the treatments even at the level of 10%.7 This statistical result suggests that framing eects
are not signicant, which is in contrast with the ndings of Sonnemans et al. (1998) that
show the existence of framing eects.
Here we additionally note a few points in our results that dier from those in Sonnemans
et al. (1998). First, the percentage of cooperative choices (38:6%) for the goods setting in
our results is lower than that of 51.1% in their results (See table 2 for our results in the
5There is some recent evidence from dictator games that the richer you are, the more altruistic you are,
holding everything else equal. In our experiments, we do not consider this possibility following the previous
works of framing eects, that is, subjects' social preferences change over the course of the experiments
(See, e.g., Andreoni (1995), Park (2000) and Sonnemans et al. (1998)). For the conclusions drawn in this
study to be valid it is assumed that the type of individuals in cooperative or individualistic is undisturbed
and unconditional social preference. To account for the aforementioned possibility, some new design in the
experiments must be introduced.
6We did not nd any random player in our subject pool, whose consistency measure is below 33% (See
Park (2000)).
7The test procedure follows Park (2000).
3goods setting). Second, for the bads setting, we do not observe any decay in the percentage
of cooperative choices in later periods, that have been observed in Sonnemans et al. (1998).
Given these dierences, we could say that whether or not to control strategic eects through
employing stranger designs as well as no questionnaires aect outcomes in the PPM.
Figure 2 presents the cooperative choices per value orientation for each treatment over
rounds. It is interesting to note that the trends are dissimilar between goods and bads
setting. The dierence between cooperative and individualistic in the bads setting seems to
be more obvious than that in the goods setting. To conrm this, we apply a Mann-Whitney
test by taking the percentage of cooperative choices per round as observation. It is not
statistically signicant for the goods setting (z = 0:530), while it is statistically signicant
for the bads setting at the 1% level (z = 3:194). This result obtained under PPM is in line
with those obtained by Park (2000), which shows that the dierence in contribution rate
between individualistic and cooperative under negative frames is more distinct than that
under positive frames.
We nally turn to the framing eects on the two dierent value orientations. Figure
3 presents the percentage of cooperative choices per treatment for each value orientation.
For individualistic case, the percentage in the goods setting are always above that in the
bads setting over all of the rounds (See the left in gure 3). In other words, individualistic
subjects consistently exhibit the framing eects even though its dierence is only 0.9% on
average (See the left in gure 3 and table 2). On the other hand, for cooperative case, there
is a surprising result: a cooperative type of subjects chooses the cooperative choices more
often in the bads setting than in the goods setting, and its dierence per treatment is 28.2%
on the average, although a clear trend all over rounds is not found (See the right in gure
3 and table 2). A Mann-Whitney test conrms that the dierence is statistically signicant
at the 1% level (z = 2:671) for individualistic (see table 3). For cooperative case, it is not
signicant at the 1% level, but signicant at the 5% level (z = 2:050).
4 Discussion and conclusion
We have examined the robustness of framing eects in the PPM by controlling strategic
eects. For this purpose, we employed the stranger design and did not implement ques-
tionnaire during the experiments, which enables us to make a direct comparison with the
important works such as Andreoni (1995) and Park (2000). We found the framing eects
are not so obvious as previously thought in the PPM, which is in sharp contrast with the
one established by Sonnemans et al. (1998). Furthermore, we have analyzed the sources of
cooperative choices with respect to the value orientations. The results are summarized in
table 3.
In general, we found the qualitatively similar results with Park (2000) on the cooperative
choices and the value orientations. One distinction is that more people cooperate in the bads
setting than in the goods setting for \cooperative" subjects. This is the main reason why
framing eects are not signicant in our study. In Park (2000), this eect is not present so
that framing eects are signicant in the VCM.
Unfortunately, we cannot provide a logical argument for this eect yet. However we
conjecture some possibilities; (i) a cooperative type of individuals may feel more obliged to
achieve ecient outcomes in the bads setting, (ii) some other concepts in game theory such
4as tit-for-tat strategies under randomly matched opponents could potentially rationalize the
results in our experiment. In any event, further analysis on the cause of this observation
must be carried out with a new design and would be left for future research.
We also admit that new experiments with continuous contributions in the PPM must be
carried out to generalize our results. However, we are hopeful that this research sheds light
on the possibility of positive eects on social welfare in public bads prevention by creating
a provision point.
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Table 2: Percentage of cooperative choices per value orientation
% in public good % in public bad
Individualistic (27/30) 38.0% 27.3%
Cooperative (10/9) 38.9% 55.5%
All(40/40) 38.6% 35.5%
Table 3: Summary of results
Overall Goods vs. Bads z=1.220
Per condition Goods Ind. vs. Coop. z=0.530
Bads Ind. vs. Coop. z=3.194
Per orientation Individualistic Goods vs. Bads z=2.671
Cooperative Goods vs. Bads z=2.050
Note: Signicant at 5% level, Signicant at 1% level. Ind. and Coop. stand for
individualistic and cooperative, respectively.
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8Appendix: Experiment instruction
With respect to experiment 1, we closely follow the procedure and instruction by Park
(2000). Therefore, we only summarize the instructions for experiment 2 below.
The instructions were originally written in Japanese. At the start of experiment 2, the
instructions are handed out on paper. The following is the translation.
Welcome to experiment 2 in the economics of decision-making. In the course of the
experiment, you will have opportunities to earn money. Any money earned during this
experiment is yours to keep. It is therefore important that you read these instructions
carefully. Please do not communicate with other participants during the experiment.
Experiment 2 will take 10 rounds. During the whole experiment, you are part of a
group which consists of ve people. Members of this group are randomly assigned where
the identity of your group members are unknown to you. After each round, you will be
randomly reassigned to a new group of ve people.
In each round, you and everyone else in your group will be asked to choose between
Yellow and Blue. You must make this decision without knowing what the others in your
group are deciding, and click the button of \Yellow" or \Blue" on your computer screen.
The public good frame The individual earning related to Yellow is  60 cents, while
the individual earning related to Blue is 0. Each group-member will get a payo dependent
on the number of Yellow choices in your group: the GROUP-REVENUE is determined as
follows:
Number of Yellow choices 0 1 2 3 4 5
Group Revenue 0 0 0 245 245 245
A payo in each round is the sum of your individual earning and group revenue. More
concretely, if you choose Blue, your payo will be equal to the GROUP-REVENUE. If you
choose Yellow, your payo will be equal to the GROUP-REVENUE minus the 60 cents.
The public bad frame The individual earning related to Yellow is 60 cents, while the
individual earning related to Blue is 0. Each group-member will get a payo dependent
on the number of Yellow choices in your group: the GROUP-REVENUE is determined as
follows:
Number of Yellow choices 0 1 2 3 4 5
Group Revenue 185 185 185 0 0 0
A payo in each round is the sum of your individual earning and group revenue. More
concretely, if you choose Blue, your payo will be equal to the GROUP-REVENUE. If you
choose Yellow, your payo will be equal to the GROUP-REVENUE plus the 60 cents.
Both frames proceed as follows: After all the members make decisions in each round,
the number of Yellow choices in your group and your payo are announced and recorded. At
the end of experiment 2, you will be paid the total of your earnings from all the 10 rounds.
9